Device security is gaining increasing importance nowadays. Mobile devices should be secure. Conventional methods establish, e.g., a static route of trust and/or dynamic route of trust in various computing environments. As shown in the following non-patent literature:    “Bootstrapping Trust in Commodity Computers.”, B. Parno, J. M. McCune, A. Perrig, IEEE S&P 2010;    “OSLO: Improving the security of Trusted Computing”, Bernhard Kauer; Trusted Computing Group http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org;    IBM 4758 Basic Services Manual: http://www-03.ibm.com/security/crypto-cards/pdfs/IBM_4758_Basic_Services_Manual_Release_2_54.pdf;    Kalman, G., Noll, J., UniK, K.: SIM as secure key storage in communication networks, in: International Conference on Wireless and Mobile Communications (ICWMC) (2007);    Noll, J., Lopez Calvet, J. C., Myksvoll, K.: Admittance services through mobile phone short messages. In: International Multi-Conference on Computing in the Global Information Technology. pp. 77-82. IEEE Computer Society, Washington, D.C., USA (2006);    Mantoro, T., Milisic, A.: Smart card authentication for Internet applications using NFC enabled phone. In: International Conference on Information and Communication Technology for the Muslim World (ICT4M) (2010) and    IBM Integrity Measurement Architecture, http://researcher.watson.ibm.com/re-searcher/view_project.php?id=2851.Either it is attested that an untrusted environment can provide some security guaranties and/or a trusted sub-environment within an untrusted computing environment is created.
However, these conventional methods nevertheless allow attacks on devices which are not necessary software-based or hardware-based. For example when challenging attacks on monitoring cameras an “abducting” of the camera itself can be performed and the camera view can be replaced with a static picture matching to the original location of the camera. One of the problems is that such an attack is hard to deter by using conventional software-based or hardware-based attestation techniques. One conventional solution to protect against camera abduction is to rely on a GPS being installed at the camera and which is secured and measured by a trusted platform module TPM. However, one of the disadvantages is, that most existing monitoring cameras are not equipped with a GPS system and therefore would cause costly hardware updates.
These disadvantages are addressed to securely position monitoring cameras by authenticating them using a visual channel as communication medium and without relying a GPS receiver in the non-patent literature of:    Srdjan Capkun and Jean Pierre Hubaux, “Secure Positionning in Wireless Networks”, IEEE JOURNAL ON SELECTED AREAS IN COMMUNICATIONS, VOL. 24, NO. 2, February 2006;    Nitesh Saxena, Secure Device Pairing based on a Visual Channel, 2006, Available from http://eprint.iacr.org/2006/050.pdf and    Joe Albowicz, Alvin Chen, Lixia Zhang, Recursive Position Estimation in Sensor Networks, Proceedings of ICNP '01 Proceedings of the Ninth International Conference on Network Protocols, 2001However, one of the disadvantages of these conventional methods is, that these methods are either complicated and/or have only a low level of security.